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ROOSEVELT'S MARGIN OF VICTORY
'.J
By FREDERICK W1EBL
On N~mbu 7, 1944, Frn"kli" D. ROO8evrlt was elected Pruident of tM
U"iud Statu for the fourth time i,. IrUCCM8WII. 'l'his evc"t of Amffic<J.1. 118 weU
as i"terrlDti(mal s1fPlifieanee i8 exumilled by (Ill A //Iuiolll lalt"!! r and labor
repruentative at p1'utmt ,i,. Chi,w who I.,.." contributed Mcveral articlu on Alller'iean
affair. to th';" periodical.
OUTSIDE the Republican camp in theUSA, thpre were few political observ-ers who doubted that Roosevelt wou.ld
win the I D44 election; the only ques-
lion was how big his margin would be. In the
·twelve ye!\l'8 during which he has boon in
power, Roosevelt has had an unprecedented
chance of organizing lJ, gigantic political mach ine
and building up a large following of people
who were in one way or another under
obligation to him and on whose votes he
could' connt. To understand this we must
look at Roosevelt's firRt three terms.
When, llfter many years of Republican rule,
Roosevelt moved into the White House in
1932, \V88hington Will flooded by unemrloyed
politioians who surged upon the capita from
the remotest corners of the United States.
-They came with requests for appointments for
1hemselves as well as for their friends back
bome. Usually these friends were the local
'distriot and precinct leaders of the Democratic
Party, who had helped to get Roosevelt elected.
Now it W88 up t,o Roosevelt to help them.
Within the first hundred days of his
'Preeidential term, Roosevelt rushed enough
bills'through the Democratic Congress to take
care of his loyal followers. He put through
the NRA (National Recovery Administration)
-Bitt, which provided many jobs for the district
'eod precinct Democratio lenders; the CCC
"(Civilian Conservation Commission) for the
"IUpport of unskilled workerR, and the PWA
(Public Works Administl'ation) for that of
skilled workcl1l. With these he could givo
jobs to aU who asked for one, provided, uf
00UJ'lle, they were members of the Democratic
Party and were found to be 10yaJ supporters
of the President himself. In addition, by
means of expedient loans from the R.E'C (Re-
«>nstruction Finance Corporation), he obtained
pledges, {rom important industrial leaders
throughout the COUlltry.
All ~is required billions of dollars. But
thoee who received this money-the entire
enlarged Democratic Party-Bpoke up for
Roosevelt and defended his spending. They
grew.so fast in numbers that they overwhelmed
&he vQices of those who objected,
TilE FEOElUL BlJREAUCIUOY
Under the American ~nstitution, the ~orty.
eight states are supposed to be practically
supremo in their own territories, and the
Federal Government is supposed to handle
only certain limited national affa.irs. But a
comparison of State Govemment employees
with the number of Federal Govemment
employees operating within anyone of the
forty-eight states reveals tho fact that there
are now far more Ft-'<1oral than State employees.
Tho Ohio State GO\'ernmcnt managc~ to get
along with 25,000 employees. But tho Fodoral
Government has 90,000 employees in Ohio.
In Ma.ssachusett.s there are 21,000 State
employees; Federal employees there tot'8l
129,000. In Pennsylvania there are 44,500
Stato employees and 215,500 Federal employees.
The State Government of Wyoming emplo}'s
1,100 people; the Fedeml Government's pay-
roll in Wyoming is 6,200.
With more than3,OOU,OOOcivilian employees-
not including the Army and Navy-the ~'ed­
eral Government now has more persons on
the taxpayers' payroll than the combined
total of all the employees of all the forty-eight
states plus aJl the employees of all the coun·
try's county and municipal governments. This
cannot be blamod on the war; for 55 per cent
of those persons are not directly engaged in
the war effort. Since July 1939-more tn."l
two ye6rt! before Pour! Harbor-the 1,'etleraJ
Government has increased the numbcr of its
new employees almost 50 per cent every six
months, det!pito repeated recommendatIons to
the contrary from Collgr . Bureaucracy, rab-
bitwise, is self-multiplying. The cOl1scquenceil
of its fecundity are apparent everywhero. When
Thomll.8 Jefferson was President (1801/09),
there was one Federal employee for every
5,308 persons. Today there is one ~'t--deral
employee for every 45 persons-men, women,
and children-and this does not include Federal
employees in the armed forces.
This bureaucracy is not elected by the
people, It is, not responsible to the people.
It does not answer for its actions a.t the polls.
ret it spends the people's money, disregards
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th will of the people'8 elected representatives,
and is extending its power over the people'8
livee--down to the last cr06S-roadB, village,
and farm.
Thus the Federal bureaucracy in the United
State8 may well be called a clQ.88 and com-
pared with the Soviet bureauoracy in the
USSR. They are similar in 8izc and lleI'Ve a
llimilar purpoee: to perpetuate the rule of
Rooeevelt and Stalin respectively.
TlIE llIACBDo""E AT WOBX
The firBt test of Rooeeve1t'8 8upportcn came
in 1936, when he ran for re-election. The
machine he had built up worked well, thanks
to the 8pecial oil with which it was greaeed.
In 1940 it wo.s more difficult. The United
States had a tradition against third term8. It
believed in a 8OO0nd term to honor a worthy
public servant but was against a third term, to
discourage presid 'nts from u8ing their potrition
to build up a voting machine which would
perpetually keep them in office by a series of
re-elections. Thi8 is exactly what Roosevelt
did. By mean8 of favoritiem and public 8pend-
ing, he managed to create a 8pecial clA88 of
Americans who received special benefits and
whoee duty it W8.ll to re-elect Roosevelt for 118
many terot8 as he dCtlired.
Once the third-term precedent had been
broken, the Democrats 88 a cl&88 began to 8how
signs of arrogance. No lODger were they
satisfied with their public-worke jobs. More
money and more favon were demanded of
Roosevelt 88 the price for making him the first
third-term president of the United State8.
Strikes took pllLee among the workere of the
PWA throughout the country. Rooeevelt faced
a crisis. Most of the important public.works
projects in the United States had been com-
pleted ootween 1932 and 1940. The general
public had begun to criticize Roosevelt'a apend-
ing, the more 110 &8 it had failed to solve the
unemployment problem. By 1940, the 1932
total of 13,000,000 unemployed had only been
reduced to 10,000,000. The public-worka proj-00'" had shifted into useless fieldB. Streets
were built which are never to be used, elaborate
buildinga were erected which were unnecessary,
even theatrical performance8 were financed
under the guise of being "public work8."
THE WAY OUT
At that time, Briti8h propagandi8ts in the
United tates were securing a certain degree of
sympathy from the American public for their
war. The country W88 swamped with prop-
aganda for "Bundles for Britain" and 80cial
aid to the destitute and war-stricken population
of Britain. This created an atm08phere of
war-conflCiou8ne88 in the United States. The
psychology of the American people moved from
publio works to war, and Roosevelt 88W a
convenient substitute for public-worka apending
in war spending.
Very BOOn after the 1940 election, Rooeeveh
embarked on a policy toward Germany con-
siBting of "war sanction8," "8teps short of war,"
orders to "shoot at sight" on German sub-
marines, and all the other familiar steps of
provocation. Simultaneou81y, like action Wall
taken against Japan; in November 1941 thia
cryst.allized in the refusal to continue negotia-
tions for the adjustment of differences between
the United States and Japan. When Japan
declared war on December 8, followed by
Germany, Rooeevelt was able to tell his country-
men that the Unit~ States "W&8 being at-
tacked." War now became the official 6Cllse
for spending. Instead of spending hundreda of
millions on public works, Roosevelt was now in
a position to apend hundreds of billions on the
war. According to the New York Doily N~
of July 23, 1944, Rooaevelt has in his twelve
presidential years spent 370 billion dollanl,
which is more than three times &8 much &8
all American Presidents before him svent
in 144 years.
Roosevelt W&8 now alm08t l\8 8upreme in the
USA &! Stalin was in the USSR. Hia political
critics attacked him "iciously, and the worken
staged numerOU8 strikes against hi8 wage
policy; but hiB bought-and·paid.for supporters
upheld his popular prestige.
In addition to the millions of penons directly
connected with the Roosevelt machine, thf're
are many milliona who have in one wa)' or
another benefited by Roosevelt'a New Deal.
Among them are more than 10,000,000 un·
employed of the thirtie8 who recall that it wu
Roosevelt who paid them their dole and who
feel that they owe their pl'e8ent employment in
the huge armament industry to Rooeevelt'.
policy. Then there i8 tho largc numher of
traditional Democrats in the South who vote
for their Party no matter who the candidate
may be ("My grandpa W88 11 Democrat, my
pa was a Democrat, and I'm a Democrat too!").
Even when the Democratic fortunes were at
their lowest, in 1928, six Southern states voted
Democratic. Furthermore, owing to hi8 pro-
Jewish policy Rooeevelt could count on prac-
tically all Jewish votes.
THE VOTES THAT COUNT
Adding up all hi8 &&fe 8upporter8 (and ..heir
wives), Roosevelt was able to enter any clec-
torial contest with a block of at least 15 million
votes on which he could rely. In 1944, more-
over, the CommuniBts were closely allied ~
Rooaevclt and refrained from putting up ..
candidate of their own, encouraging all their
followen and 8ympathizenl to vote for Roo8e-
velt.
To qualify for voting, an American must be
(a) over 21; (b) a citizen; (c) not a convict;
(d) not deprived of his civil rights; (e) able to
read and \\Tite; (f) registered. At preeent
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Republlran8 ami ])cmO<'mt,s In U,e 111.1.•Ix prCllldentlal
flectlo".. S....t,~'1! with a RellUbllran maiorlty arc "bown In
"'hlte, thooc wlt.h a n.·,norrnt.lc maiorlty I.n black. The
"haded area In the Orst mal' i. Wll!OOtll!ln, which votro Olc
"J'rogJ'Clllll\'c" ticket In I!l'Z~. S....te<l with a Republican
malorlty In 1044 were: (I) Maine, (2, Vermont, (3) Ohio,
(4, IndlaUll. a" WIJ!coIll!In, (6j Iowa, 17, North Dakota.
\8) South Uakola, (9, l\ebrasta, (IO) Kalll'Wl, (II) WyomlDl!,
lIZ} Colorado
Reduced to per cents, we find that this time
Roosevelt got into the White House with
fi:J.3G per cent of the total number of
Democratic and Republican votes. (The votes
cast for third parties were negligible; the
exact figure has not becom known hore.)
The slimness of Roosevelt',; margin of victory
represents the true sensation of the electi01l8
of 1944.
If we recall the adva.ntages with whieh
Roosevelt went into the elect.ions; if we con-
sider that Dewey could in no way compare as
a public figure with Roosevelt, being a man of
limited popular appeal and with practically no
personal following or any program of hifl own;
if we take into account tbat, in t.he interest
of the prosecution of the war, the RepublicaJl8
had to refrain from making the important
Plurality
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But as the same report maintained that the
civilian vote was GO.7 per cent in favor of
Hoosevelt--a gross error-we must doubt the
accuracy of the first figure. According to the
lll.8t. figures we received (Lisbon, November 10),
Roosevelt obtained 24,249 100 votes against
Dewey's 21,1\')5,300. Roose,e1t's margin of
victory being 3.053,~00 votes. To appreciat.e
the significance of this margin, one should
compare it with that of the first three
Roosevelt election';
there are in America ul million people with tho
qualifications (a) ami (b). l:iubtracting those
lacking the qualifications (c) to (0), there still
remain some 77 million. Alter deducting tho,e
who for objecti ve reasons (recent change of
residence, for example) do not POSSCl:lS fJual-
ification (f), them ollght to be Rome 75 million
American qualified to vote. If we subtract
the 15 million safl:' Hoosevclt votes, we find
that the real contest in the election was for
the remaining 00 million votes. Prior to the
elections American commentators and news
agencie predict<:,d a very hot fight, and many
llpected lin unprecedented participation of
votQrs in the elections. But when the voteR
C&llt for ROOSlW('lt and Dewev were coullted, it
WBl! found that th('y numher~d only 4;'),444,400.
, me 30 million p ·ople had not eXf'reifled their
privilege of voting for the highest office in th
country.
Among these 30 million there were, of course,
lOme who could not go to the polls for reasons
8U h as :ickneRs or old age. There are also
'IOme {i million negro voters in the South who
are effectively barrpd from voting by varioul:l
devices. But this still leaves a sizeable figure
of at IC1ll,st 22 milJion voters who went on a
voting t;trike on November 7. Why? ~ome
because they did not see much difference be-
twoon the two candidates; others because they
felt that the real bORses of the country stood
behind Roosevelt as well all behind Dewey;
others again for the simple rell.8on that "they
didn't give a damn." America regards herself
&8 the champion of the democratic cause and
claims the right to tell other nations what real
democracy is. Yet it is a bad sign for Amer-
ican democracy if one third of the electorate
.does not participate in the elections.
If from the total number of potential voters
W6 8ubtract Roosevelt's safe votes at; well Il.fl
thtl 30 milJion who did not vote, we find that
the decision lay with the remaining 30 millions.
A very largo proportion among them arc in
uniform (the total number of men in the U'
armed forces is at present around II million).
As President, Roosevelt got 1\11 the publioity
he wanted among the armed forces these last
few years. rn addition, he ill the nation's
commlUlder in chief. Although many of the
soldicrs may have resented going to war after
Rooeevelt had promised in 194.0 not to send
them into foreign wars, and although the
voting is by secret ballot., it iR to be assumed
that a certain num ber of otherwise indifferent
soldiers would rather vot-o for their eomma.nder
in chief than against him. The fact that
Rooeevelt had championed a simplified method
of BOldiers' voti.ng had also no doubt earned
him political sympathies in the armed forces.
We do not know for sure what the result of
the voting a.mong the men in the Army and
Navy wa~. One unofficial report stated that
it was 72.6 per cent in fa,or of Roosevelt.
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fielda of foreign affairs and military strategy
election issuea; and if, finally, we realize that
many people who oppoHed Roo8evelt were in-
clined to vote for him merely in order to avoid
the confusion which would attend a change in
administration at this crucial stage of the war-
then we must ask: how is it possible that
Rooeevelt only obtainL'<I so small a margin!
LAUOR AND ROOSEVBLT
Tho answer is to be found in the general
dissatisfaction wit·h l~oosevelt'll policy, a dis-
satisfaction whieh, as the election results show,
goea much deeper than many people imagined.
It even pervaded tbe raw of Labor, which
had in previous elections been responsible for
a good deal of Rooseveit'li winning margin.
Thia time, many workcrs have apparently
eitber ,'uted for the Republieans-although
theee have never been cOll8iderc<.l a pro-Labor
p~y-or not. voted at all. Labor's attitude
~&ol &1Ilo been influencc<.l by Roosevelt's handling
.onhe trade-union proLlem in recent years.
In 1932, Roosevelt appealed directly to the
American FL'<.leration of Labor and obtained. its
·suPPort by promising pro-Labor legislation.
But ftoosevelt could not afford to let Labor
grow too strong because of the big-businel:l8 in-
terest8 behind the Democratic Party. In 1936
lie decided to weaken Labor by splitting ill
into two fActioll8. For this purpose he span-
soeed John L. Lewis, the dialIenting leader
who was the personal rival of William Green,
the President of the AI<' of 1:.. Roosevelt did
thia by p~ing the Wagner Act, which pro-
Ti~ed for "collective bargaining" byemployOOJol'
reproeentatives with the employer corporation!!,
thUll legalizing the organization of new union ..
in :6eldA which were not covered by AF of
L ~ion!!. Lewil4 was now able to organize
the Congress of Industrial Organizationa, and
in . the 1930 elections hoth the AF of Land
cm fuUy supported Rooaevelt. It was the
year of Roosevelt's great-est margin of vic.
tot,.
After the election. however, Roosevelt
dropped ~is 8Upport of the cm. He had now
brought 8ufficient disunity into the ranks of
organized Lahor to prevent All po88ibility of
Labor uniting and spoDBOring its own can·
didate for the presidency. As Labor could not
eXpeGt ariything from the Republicall8, both
factionn had to bid against each other for
RooHcvelt'll favors. By playing the sphinx and
being noncommittal, Roosevelt managed to
()h"in the official support both of the AF of
L alld ClO in the oloetioll8 of 1940 and 1944.
Neverthele.'i8, individual members of these Labor
unions did not consider them!J(llves bound bv
'the commitments made by their leaders. Many
1UItenPd to John L. Lewis, who had boon replaced
by Philip Murray in the presidency of the
CIO and had become a bitter opponent of
BocMevelt.
MORB UASONS J'OB DISSATISFACTION
Among other sectiona of America's popuJa.
tion there was also much dissatisfaction willa
Rooeevelt. Of COUl'8e, election lIpeeches should
not be taken too seriously. Still the critioism
voieed in tbese speeches against Roose"elt gives
certain indications of the sources of unrest. n
is interesting t.Q note that tbe fourth term as
such W&BonIy a minor issue when compared with
the opposition directed against t.he third term
during the 1940 campaign. Apparently the
Americans felt that, once the no-third-tenn
principle bad been violated, there was· no
llelUlC in establiahing a no·fourth.tcrm principle.
The point8 at issue most frequently men-
tioned ill the anti·Roosevelt campaign spoeoh-
08 were the incompetence of tbe Rooaevelt
boreaucracy so glaringly demonstrated in .the
COUl'llC of tbe country's mobilization; di8trust
in many of the men whom Roosevelt had put
into the country's key positions; the appre-
henaion that the growing centralization of
power in the hands of a bureaucracy not
directly responsible to the nation reprettented
& mortal danger to democracy; anger over tho
false information given by Roosevelt on tbe
COUl'8e, I088C8, and duration of the war; the
absence of reliable poMtwar economic p1aDs;
the fear that Roosevelt-who, in spite of a
spending program of oM billion dollars in hi./I
first two terms bad undor peace.time conditions
not been able to reduce the number of unem.
ployed below 10 millions-would not 80Ive t.he
employment problem after the war cith~r; and
the fooling that Roosevelt W&8 re.sponsible for
many serious war.time strikes.
With aU theee and many other re&8Ona for
dis8a.tisfaction with Roosevelt, the American
voters found ilhemselves in a quandary on
November 7. What were those opposed to
Rooscvelt to do! They could vote for Dewey;
but he was a man who, on all impOrtant
issuC8, either said "Yea-but" to Roosevelt's
plans or advocated the return to economic and
social conditions which mOilt people realised
could not be l'Cstored. Or they could refrain
from voting. Many of the votes cast for
Dewey were not 80 much for Dewey a.~ again.~t
HOOlWVelt. Take the Poli.'!lr-Americall8 who
voted the Ropublican ticket. They knew 'hat
Poland had boon sold out to Stalin, no matter
wbo would be the next President. Ye~ by
voting for Dewey they could at least expl'C88
their disappointment in Roosevelt for breaking
hia "Atlantic Charter" promises.
The 194.4 presidential elections have given
Roosevelt his fourth term. But his dom('l8tic
and international prestige bas suffered by the
precarious margin of hia victory. The man who,
in one of the crucial moments of America's his-
tory and holding more aces in his hand than any
previous president, receivc<.l the Impport of only
53 per cent of tbe total votes" cast, can haI'dly
claim to l}().~sess thc nation's full con6denee.
